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Abstract: 
Among the most generative – but oft-misunderstood – ideas found in Peter Berger’s 
magisterial work is the idea that religions depend on plausibility structures. This assertion 
points toward the social worlds in which religious ideas and practices take on meaning. The 
most powerful situation for a religious system is one in which the entire taken-for-granted 
world falls under a sacred canopy. The fracturing of that canopy was at the heart of the theory 
of secularization Berger put forward. This chapter argues that no such comprehensive canopy 
is necessary for sustaining religious systems. We should instead examine the social 
interaction at the base of the plausibility structures, namely the conversations in which a 
sacred view of the world is sustained. Likewise, we must situate those conversations in the 
practical, embodied, and material experiences described as “lived religion.”  
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When Peter Berger published his foundational text in 1967, it was a logical theoretical 
extension of the work he had done with Thomas Luckmann in the preceding years (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966). The Social Construction of Reality, now recognized as among the 
most influential books of the twentieth century, had laid out a phenomenology of 
consciousness that placed the innermost realms of knowledge and identity squarely in a social 
matrix of micro-interaction and macro-structures. It built on classical social theory, but also 
on European critical theories and especially the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz. How is it, 
they asked, that we come to act in the world as we do? In short, we engage in a process of 
externalizing our experience through language, internalizing the responses of others to us, 
and coming to accept the resulting social product as objective reality. As Berger then argued 
in The Sacred Canopy, the same social processes that produce the rest of reality also produce 
religion. Throughout, he brilliantly combines Schutz’s phenomenology with Marx’s 
dialectical materialism and Mead’s symbolic interactionism. 
The picture of a dynamic social process that structures religious ideas and experience 
was a powerful one. The theory took as its “normal” state of affairs a situation where the 
responses of others were more or less congruent; the resulting taken-for-granted reality was 
more or less the same for the people interacting with and in it. That interactive context is 
what Berger termed a “plausibility structure.” In one of his late works, he mused, “I am very 
fond of this concept. I coined it” (2014: 31). In The Sacred Canopy, he defines it thus: 
“[E]ach world requires a social ‘base’ for its continuing existence as a world that is real to 
actual human beings. The ‘base’ may be called its plausibility structure” (p. 44). These are 
the relationships and social structures within which we go about our lives in an “of course” 
kind of way.1 Berger illustrates this with a stinging and poignant account of the way Spanish 
conquest destroyed the activities and social relationships on which Inca civilization was built 
– its plausibility structure – transforming the Inca world into “first, unspeakable anomy, then 
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a more or less nomized existence on the fringes of the Spaniard’s world – that other world, 
alien and vastly powerful, which imposed itself as reality-defining facticity upon the numbed 
consciousness of the conquered” (p. 46). No postcolonial thinker in subsequent decades could 
have said it better. But the larger point, for our purposes, is that religious ways of life rest on 
the social structures in which they exist. 
This basic insight, and the concept he used to describe it, are among his most 
troublesome – and most useful – contributions. The concept is troublesome for a number of 
reasons. First, it is so often misunderstood. Using the term “plausibility” has deceived more 
than one first-time reader into thinking this is about logic and reason. Religious ideas, they 
think, have to be reasonable and logical to maintain their “plausibility.” The decline of 
religion in the modern world is therefore a matter of the logical implausibility of superstition. 
Not at all. Only if the “reason” and “logic” in question is understood in the phenomenological 
sense of Berger’s argument. The logic we impute to our world is a logic based on our taken-
for-granted assumptions about how things work. That, in turn, is built on a structure of social 
relations; and it is that social setting that constitutes the plausibility structure, not the ideas 
themselves. 
The notion that religious ideas rest on a structure of social relations was also 
troublesome in a way that Berger recognized in his own text. It seems to imply that religion is 
the “dependent variable” in every case. He, however, emphatically rejected the Marxian 
notion that religion is a mere reflection of the social structure, opting for a more Weberian 
tack. Not unlike Weber’s notion of “elective affinity,” with its skirting of causal arguments, 
Berger’s understanding of religion’s relationship to the social structure decidedly allows for 
influence in both directions. Social arrangements can make religious ideas and practices more 
and less possible; religious ideas (and he mostly addresses ideas, not practices) can drive 
changes in social arrangements. 
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The other conceptual problem that Berger addressed in The Sacred Canopy is the fact 
that plausibility structures are never fully internalized. They are subject to manifold shocks. 
Children will arrive and ask “why?”  Dreams and prophecies will interrupt the world as it is. 
Exile can remove all the familiar props. As a human construction, the plausibility structure is 
subject to the dynamics of human interaction and change. Berger’s chapters on religious 
legitimation and theodicy gave his answer to the social mechanisms that are necessary for 
maintaining the worlds we live in – in spite of the fragility of social (and biological) life. In 
the face of the threats, we still strive to establish a social world in which we can return to 
“normal.” 
Less clearly resolved in Berger’s formulation is the “normal” he assumes. He noted 
the fragile and changing nature of social structures, but he assumed that there would be an 
equilibrium, a “nomos” that would replace the “anomy.” True enough. What we have learned 
since about cognitive psychology would support that view of human cognition (DiMaggio 
1997). But more problematic is his imagination of that all-encompassing religious plausibility 
structure – the “sacred canopy.”2  While he did note the difference between a “religious 
monopoly” and the “sectarian” situation of living in a sub-world (having a “sacred tent” 
perhaps), the sectarian world he described is no less encompassing than the monopoly one – 
just smaller. He spoke of the different “social engineering” necessary in the two situations, 
but the picture is still one where a religious view of the world is maintained by a single 
religious plausibility structure. 
That sectarian social engineering task was, in fact, the theoretical question that 
informed my own earliest research, examining the plausibility structure for a 
“fundamentalist” view of the world (Ammerman, 1987). That world was a religious “normal” 
that fit Berger’s theory. Where a religious monopoly exists or where a religious subworld 
attempts to maintain very tight boundaries, the picture Berger paints is a theoretically useful 
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one. The religious person is sustained in a religious view of the world by being surrounded in 
all her most significant relationships by others whose actions and assumptions reinforce the 
taken-for-granted nature of that world. 
The reality of modern pluralism and competition, however, is less well-explained by 
the theory Berger offers us in The Sacred Canopy. This is the site of some of the most 
troublesome conclusions in the book, some of which he later attempted to resolve.3 In the 
final chapters, as he developed his theory of secularization, he assumed that being surrounded 
by social worlds in which multiple religious and secular ideas compete would make religious 
ideas less sustainable, with secular explanations crowding out the religious ones. Living in a 
world whose structures are technological and market driven, the habits and beliefs of 
religious traditions would be sustainable only in individual consciousness and as consumable 
commodities. In contrast to the situation of religious monopoly, all religious traditions in 
pluralist contexts must be marketed, he said. “[They] must be ‘sold’ to a clientele that is no 
longer constrained to ‘buy.’ The pluralistic situation is, above all a market situation” (137; 
italics in original).  Religion becomes, in this view, socially insignificant. Having lost its 
coherent social supports, it is too fragmented and privatized to have any effect on individual 
or collective life. 
In spite of this unfortunate detour in Berger’s theorizing, I want to suggest that we 
need not discard the notion that religions rest on social plausibility structures. What we must 
do, however, is alter both our understanding of what religion is and our understanding of how 
a plausibility structure works. For the former we have to go beyond what Berger gave us in 
The Sacred Canopy. For the latter, however, we can return to the foundational theoretical 
work he gives us in the early part of the book. I turn first to those strands in Berger’s own 
theory. 
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The Power of Conversation 
 
In Berger’s recapping of the argument he and Luckmann made in The Social 
Construction of Reality, language and conversation play critical roles. He points out that we 
appropriate our view of the world in conversation with others, and the language we use 
provides us with the categories that order that world. “On the foundation of language, and by 
means of it, is built up the cognitive and normative edifice that passes for ‘knowledge’ in a 
society” (p. 20). Building on Mead and the symbolic interactionists, Berger points to this very 
human activity of using language to navigate the world. Arranged into stories and 
admonitions and descriptions, our words become conversations, exchanges between people, 
in which the meaning of the words is expressed, modified, and internalized. This is the micro-
foundation of what Berger means by a plausibility structure. There are also macro-structures 
that cannot be ignored, but it is everyday conversation that maintains the taken-for-
grantedness of the world. As Berger points out, “The world begins to shake in the very instant 
that its sustaining conversation begins to falter” (p. 21). This is a way in which the concept of 
a plausibility structure can continue to serve us well. 
In my 2013 book Sacred Stories, Spiritual Tribes: Finding Religion in Everyday Life, 
I examined that micro-foundation, looking at the social world as framed in narratives and 
expressed in conversations. Following Somers (1994), I have conceptualized religious 
identity as an individual autobiographical narrative (what Somers labels “ontological”) by 
which persons orient their actions so that they are in continuity with who they have perceived 
themselves to be, but which (like any script) allows improvisation and revision. That 
individual story, of course, is always in dialogue with the many “public narratives” of the 
institutions that constitute our shared lives. Whether as a family or a corporation, a team or a 
congregation, we share a story about who we are; and that story, too, is constantly being 
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revised and improvised. Finally, we live inside a few master stories, or metanarratives (like 
Schutz’s world-taken-for-granted) with such hegemonic power that we often do not see their 
authorial hand.  
What I suggested in a 2003 essay is that religious identity is like all other identities, 
residing in just this sort of multi-layered narrative (Ammerman, 2003). Out of early 
socialization and deep existential experiences, there is an autobiographical narrative that may 
include any of a wide range of spiritual orientations. A more or less pro-secular hegemonic 
metanarrative in the culture may limit expectations about what sorts of spiritual presence and 
action one might expect. But both those internal narratives and the metanarratives are 
constantly staged in particular institutionalized social settings with their own expectations 
about the kinds of stories that can be told and enacted there.  
All three layers are always present; each can shape the others; and none is by 
definition beyond the reach of enchantment. The presence or absence of spiritual characters 
and actions in those narratives is one way to look for the socially-constructed reality of 
religion in the world. The variation in spiritual narration reflects both differences between 
individuals and differences in the cultural and institutional contexts being narrated. Some 
locations and situations call forth religious realities, while others present themselves as 
wholly secular. And some people are far more spiritually-attuned than others and can find the 
spiritual strands in the most secular of contexts. 
But beyond the individual and institutional differences, our research found differences 
that were traceable to the presence or absence of religiously-relevant relationships and 
conversations.4 Not surprisingly, spiritual stories about everyday life were most common 
among those who attend religious services most frequently – no matter which tradition they 
were in. Congregations and other organized spiritual groups are still important sites of 
religious culture production (contra Bender, et al. 2011). Most telling, however, it was not 
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just being there that mattered most. It was participating in activities beyond weekly worship 
in which informal conversation was a typical mode of interaction. Whether choir practice or 
committee meeting, women’s spirituality group or weekly Torah study, participation with a 
community mattered. 
These conversational sites of interaction are the smaller, portable, flexible, and 
permeable plausibility structures of complex modern societies. This is where spiritual 
discourse can be a primary lingua franca, but where everyday life is also very present, where 
elements of spirituality can naturally intersect with accounts of who people are and what they 
do with themselves. They learn and use spiritual language, and it shapes their way of being in 
the world. The more deeply embedded our subjects were in organized sites of spiritually-
infused conversation, the more likely they were to carry strands of that conversation with 
them.  As participants in a religious community, people develop a way of talking about life 
that carries within it expectations about the presence of divine actors, about mysteries beyond 
human comprehension, and about the normative goodness of living by the Golden Rule. As 
people chat over a potluck dinner or pray during a meeting of a women's group, the everyday 
stories they tell are likely to foreground spiritual interpretations. They come to think of sacred 
and secular as intertwined. What happens in these religious gatherings is not just a matter of 
otherworldly ritual and doctrinal teaching. What happens is the creation of a particular kind 
of conversational space. 
In some sense this is what Berger (1967) meant when he described modern religion as 
existing in "sheltering enclaves.” But it is more. These are not enclaves with high walls, 
where the sacred world is kept pure and well-defended. Their ability to be powerful 
producers of sacred consciousness does not depend on keeping all other realities at bay. It 
depends on their ability to evoke sacred reality in powerful ritual events and proffer coherent 
explanations of the cosmos. But mostly, their power as sacred culture producers is in the 
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degree to which they allow sacred and profane to combine. The conversations in these spaces 
are inevitably full of the stuff of everyday life, with mundane and sacred realities 
intermingling.  
Indeed, the two may become part of one multi-vocal reality. As Ziad Munson (2006) 
wrote about the pro-life activists he was observing, the funerals held for aborted fetuses are 
both religious and political at the same time. Activists use religious symbols, rituals, and 
consciousness to express “something beyond” at the same time that they send a political 
message about how our common life ought to be arranged. One need not look to something 
so ritually potent to see this intermingling, however. Wherever we see everyday concerns 
expressed in religious language and company, the symbols of each will shape the other. 
Congregations gain their potency as producers of sacred consciousness not through their 
exclusivity or high boundaries, but as they create spaces for and encourage opportunities to 
imagine and speak about everyday realities among spiritual compatriots. 
When people step beyond their religious communities, of course, they encounter an 
enormously plural and functionally complex modern world. People move through life with a 
shifting cast of characters in a shifting array of institutional settings. The primary mode of 
discourse and interaction in much of that world is likely to be very this-worldly and non-
spiritual. The task is to get the airplane built or get the politician elected or measure out the 
right doses of medicine. Berger is right that the dominant reality mode is a pragmatic secular 
one that we assume others share and that allows us to proceed on common reality grounds.  
That dominance, however, does not mean monopoly, nor does it mean inevitability. 
While the balance of sacred and secular assumptions may shift over time and place, most 
social scientists have joined Berger himself in asserting that the balance is by no means one 
that must always shift in a secular direction. Nor, as Mary Douglas observed in the 1980s, 
should we assume that earlier generations were living in an utterly enchanted world (Douglas, 
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1983). What we have increasingly recognized is that we moderns are living in a world that is 
not nearly so disenchanted as Weber and most of sociology once imagined (Weber, 1958). To 
observe mundane empirical explanations emerging in science or medicine, “as if God does 
not exist,” does not predetermine where or whether other parts of life may be infused with 
spiritual presence (or even that the scientists see their work as without religious significance). 
It is nevertheless the case that religious presence is sometimes constrained (and 
sometimes encouraged) by the particular social settings in question. There was evidence in 
our research of the modern “differentiation” of social functions, but it was by no means a 
complete segregation. Sacred consciousness was part of the story more often when the story 
was about family and home, for instance, than when it was about working as a business 
person. Working as an artist or scientist, in contrast, was more often interwoven with a 
spiritual sensibility. Most people recounted their efforts to eat right and stay healthy as 
guided by secular science and education. Their response to serious illness and death, on the 
other hand, was often heavily laden with prayer and spiritual presence. The multiple layers of 
reality and multiple narratives are perhaps nowhere better seen than in the person who prays 
for God to guide the doctor’s hand. 
The presence of multiple realities, each perhaps primarily institutionalized in a 
particular sector of society, creates the possibility for conflict, doubt, and power struggles. 
There can be boundary disputes when a way of framing a situation is deemed inappropriate 
for the context. There can be doubts when sacred consciousness is called into question by 
secular expertise. As the neo-institutionalists have argued, there are dominant logics at work 
in each organizational “field” (Friedland and Alford, 1991). What has become increasingly 
clear in other studies of organizations, however, is that these logics are never air-tight. The 
“cultural capital” (as Bourdieu [1991] would describe it) from one field might or might not be 
permitted and useful in another. Decades ago feminists began arguing that “the personal is 
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political” and that inflexible boundaries between home and work were not good for people. 
They were pointing to the ways institutional boundaries were and should be more permeable 
than theorists (and some managers) have assumed them to be.  
Berger (2014) describes the presence of multiple secular and sacred realities as “code 
switching.”  That is certainly apt, but I suspect it may still draw too clear a distinction 
between codes and the fields they belong to. Sometimes people are aware of moving back 
and forth, but just as often they seem to occupy a single location that is both secular and 
sacred at the same time. It is not that our intrinsic foundational reality is secular, while our 
extrinsic world of choice can be religious if we wish. Rather, I am convinced that the mix of 
sacred and secular is more like “Spanglish” than like being bilingual. Words from both 
languages appear in the same sentence, sometimes modified in ways not native to either 
language. A person eats a kosher vegetarian diet both to express religious devotion and to 
stay healthy. A scientist reads his journals with a prayerful attitude that opens his mind to the 
solution he has been puzzling over.  
In neither of these cases is this a matter of utterly individual invention and choice, 
although it is that. These are modern actors, after all. They have developed their spiritual 
ways of seeing and acting in the modern world through socially constructed and 
institutionalized arenas of conversation. Spiritual presence is a social reality. Religion is 
expressed and reproduced in actions and conversations. There are forms of social interaction 
that function as religious plausibility structures in the midst of the multiple layers of structure 
and constraint that may also be present. The characters with whom we share the stage at any 
given moment are not neatly compartmentalized by the stage we are on, and narratives from 
different parts of life are drawn on and refashioned across domains. Wherever there are social 
spaces in which religious and spiritual assumptions can enter the conversation, there is a 
12 
 
religious plausibility structure. One spiritually-inclined person discovers another such person, 
and they start to talk.  
People of faith seem, in fact, to have a knack for finding each other. We may not be 
surprised to find that roughly three-quarters of household partners share a common religious 
affiliation, but it is surprising that two-thirds of the work-based friendships we documented 
were described to us as religiously homogeneous—not necessarily people sharing exactly the 
same religious tradition, but people who think of each other as religiously similar. And in 
those religiously-similar work friendships, people were more likely to report that they talk 
about religion. What I am suggesting here is that religious identities are part of the package of 
cultural cues that constitute the ever-shifting “tribes” of modern society (Maffesoli, 1995), 
the signals by which we recognize each other. We establish relationships, across multiple 
institutional domains that either constrain or enable the production of religious realities. 
Plausibility structures are, then, as relevant as an analytical tool as they ever were. 
The key is recognizing that they need not be totalizing structures. While there are societies 
where something like a religious (or atheist) monopoly exists, that is not the only way a 
plausibility structure works. Nor must a religious plausibility structure be sustained by a 
tightly-bounded sectarian institution. By recognizing the fluid character of the social 
networks of modern social life, we can also recognize the fluid and shifting relationships in 
which religious conversations constitute the religious plausibility structures of everyday life. 
 
Religion beyond Consciousness 
 
Equally important, a contemporary understanding of religion has to go beyond 
Berger’s emphasis on consciousness and worldview. Even his later writing often assumes that 
whatever spiritual reality finds its way into the secular world is carried inside the individual 
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mind. His remains a mid-century Protestant understanding of religion that focuses on 
individual belief, and as the sociological study of religion slowly expands to encompass 
empirical encounters around the world, such definitions have rightly been called into question 
(Bender et al. 2011).  
The inadequacy of belief- and membership-based understandings has been 
highlighted by many recent writers, among them Talal Asad (1993). Like other postcolonial 
thinkers, Asad points to the historically-situated nature of the very category “religious” itself. 
What counts as religious in any time and place is not a matter of some universal essence, but 
a product of the powers and authoritative disciplines at work in that place. Our preoccupation 
with worldviews, Asad argues, is a very modern one. He critiques Geertz’s (1973) classic 
‘cultural’ definition of religion for its attempt to put everything into a cosmic framework, 
essentially making theology the defining practice of religion. "It is a modern idea that a 
practitioner cannot know how to live religiously without being able to articulate that 
knowledge" (1993: 36). Asad could as easily have been talking about Berger. 
In some circles, Asad’s critique nearly brought the study of “religion” to its knees, but 
that need not be so. The turn of which his thinking was a part was a turn to a broader 
definition of religion. It travels under many banners – religious practices, material religion, 
folk religion – but one useful rubric is “lived religion,” most prominently developed by 
McGuire (2008), Hall (1997), and Orsi (2003). This growing body of work has provided new 
ways to think about how modern people manage to be both religious and secular at the same 
time and how religion is expressed in more than words.  
The study of lived religion has been useful, but it has sometimes been limited by its 
own preoccupations with what it is not.5 Research often set up artificial binaries between 
institutional religion and lived religion or between elite religion and the lived religion of 
ordinary lay people. While that emphasis on moving beyond institutional membership and 
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official dogma has been necessary, the most fruitful work in this field has placed religion in a 
field of practice, practice that is fully material and can happen anywhere and among any 
population. In introducing the concept, David Hall (1997) says that “one term – “practice” – 
does have particular importance” (p. xi). As Aune (2015) demonstrates in her study of 
feminists in the UK, practice is central to their sense of what it means to be religious or 
spiritual. They, like the subjects of much lived religion research, freely adopt practices both 
from their own religious traditional origins and from others, but it is rituals and ways of 
living that matter. These rituals and ways of living are “everyday,” but they are not always - 
or even mostly - disconnected from religious institutions and traditions. The European “folk” 
or “majority” churches, for example, may have relatively empty pews on Sunday morning, 
but their yearly holidays, rituals, music, and service to the community have not disappeared 
from the everyday world (Davie, 2000). Theirs is neither a sacred canopy nor a sheltering 
enclave nor a privatized worldview. Lived religion is found in shared religious practices, 
some traditional and some not. 
 The focus on practice also means a focus on embodiment. McGuire (2007) turns our 
attention to gardening, healing, and dancing as spiritual practices, while others venture into 
more exotic practices such as mixed martial arts (Greve, 2014). We have learned about rituals 
of birth (Klassen, 2001) and death (Laderman, 1995) that take the unavoidably physical 
aspects of those human experiences seriously. Rather than confining religion’s domain to the 
“beliefs about” experience, we have asked how bodies enter into and express connections 
with spirituality. Bodily sensations of touch, smell, and movement are vehicles for religious 
creativity (e.g., Lϕvland and Repstad, 2014). The conversational plausibility structures we 
inhabit are made up of more than just words. There are bodies and physical sensations in 
those spaces as well.  
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Nor can one live religion without feelings (see Johnson in this volume). Attention to 
emotion has been one important product of attention to gender. The turn to the experience of 
women – and to men as men, not just as the default universal – has been an important aspect 
of the first generation of studies of lived religion. The emotional dimensions of human life 
are highly complex, of course, and sociologists will need to draw on the work of 
psychologists and cognitive scientists to bring this fully to bear. Riis and Woodhead (2010), 
however, have laid out a very helpful framework for the sociological study of religious 
emotion. It is a starting point for understanding the individual and social patterns that shape 
intense human experiences and mark those experiences as religious. 
The study of lived religion has distinctly turned our attention to the way bodies, 
emotions and extraordinary experiences are critical to any analysis of how religion is situated 
in social life, both as expressed in institutionalized activity and as encountered beyond 
organized religion. We can be equally interested in the embodied experience of Eucharist or 
Friday prayers and in the embodied experience of a home birth. When we examine the human 
dimensions through which sacred things are being produced, encountered, and shared– 
wherever they happen and whoever the actors are – we are studying plausibility structures for 
modern spiritual life. It is not just belief or institutional location that gives something 
religious meaning. One does not have to be a “believer” to be moved by the ritual acts of 
kneeling or candle lighting or communal eating (Sack, 2000). Singing together has spiritual 
power, even when not everyone shares a common view of the world (Heider and Warner, 
2010).  
In addition to adding bodies to the religious mix, lived religion research has also 
incorporated the emphasis on material culture that has long been present in our sister 
disciplines of Anthropology and Religious Studies (McDannell, 1995; Vasquez, 2010). The 
cultural turn in Sociology has followed with its own turn to the material (Edgell, 2012; Neitz, 
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2011), a turn reflected in the study of religion. We have learned about food ways (Diamond, 
2002; Koepping, 2008) that are situated in religious ways of being in the world. And with the 
increasing presence of Muslim veils on European and American streets, we have noticed how 
clothing and jewelry of all sorts can express religious identity (Arthur, 1999; Furseth, 2011). 
Wherever that veiled Muslim goes, in fact, she introduces the reality that not everything is 
governed by modern reason, secular efficiency, and pluralist neutrality. When she wears her 
hijab under a hard hat or laboratory goggles or graduation cap, she stands as a visible 
reminder that sacred and secular exist side by side. 
 Methodologically, attention to material culture has meant new attention to visual 
evidence (Williams, 2015), along with the textual. In her study of hospital chaplains, for 
example, Cadge (2013) analyzes chapel spaces as well as bedside routines. Omar McRoberts 
(2003) makes urban streets a factor in the religious lives he studied. My own research has 
demonstrated that spiritual experience can be embedded in everything from clothing and 
jewelry to mementos on a desk and a favorite chair by a window (Ammerman, 2013). Places 
and things are a critical dimension of lived religion, ways that people literally touch 
transcendence. The people we interviewed needed no grand theory to explain what was 
important about an object or place, although there was almost always a story. This thing or 
this place, the story said, participated in producing, encountering, and often sharing 
something sacred about life. 
The material and spatial dimensions of religious cultural life are important to 
understanding religious life both outside religious institutions and inside. If we shed the 
Protestant preoccupation with sermons, and pay attention to all the ways in which 
institutional religion is itself material, we learn a great deal. I have long advocated that 
students of congregational life ask their informants to take them on a walking tour of the 
space the congregation occupies (Ammerman, 1998). The artifacts unearthed on such a tour 
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may bear little resemblance to the official guide to the congregation’s building. They 
represent instead the way the people in the congregation live in its space. They are using that 
material environment as part of their production of and encounter with the sacred they share, 
and their different appropriations of the space may reflect the different cultures they bring in 
(Hoover, 2014), as well as what they have collectively created.  
Across the world, institutional religious spaces play constantly evolving roles in the 
cultures they inhabit (Vasquez and Marquardt, 2003). Otherwise non-religious spaces can be 
collectively marked as sacred, as well, while individual sacred spaces abound, often marked 
by physical symbols of their meaning and function. Often sacred spaces are transient, as 
when memorials mark the public spaces where someone has tragically died. Sidewalks, 
candles, teddy bears, and ribbons are very mundane secular objects that are sacralized by the 
collective actions of a community (Grider, 2006). And in the midst of televisions and dining 
tables and all the other mundane stuff of everyday living, home altars are reminders of sacred 
presence and sites of religious ritual (Konieczny, 2009). Again, attention to religion as 
practiced enlarges the scope of inquiry and points away from assumptions that religion is 
diminished by its presence in mundane form. 
Paying attention to what people do and how they inhabit the material world does not 
mean we ignore what they say. As Robert Wuthnow (2011) has admonished, we should “take 
talk seriously.” In addition to the texts people produce and the way they answer questions, 
lived religion suggests attention to words found in musical lyrics, internet interactions, and 
popular culture as ways people create everyday transcendence. My own work (2013) has 
focused on how people tell stories about their everyday lives. This attention to discourses is 
an attempt to listen for how ordinary people make meaning – not grand coherent theories of 
life, but small stories that weave together pieces of a life and connect them to something 
bigger. When Robert Orsi wrote The Madonna of 115th Street (1985), he called these attempts 
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to talk about divine presence in ordinary life “theologies of the street,” and theologians 
themselves have begun to take up the task of working from grassroots experience.6   
Here the emphasis is not so much on establishing the meanings and belief structures 
reflected in words as in examining the practices that use words. Like other practices, religious 
discursive work is portable, occurring across the social contexts in which people live their 
lives. Some practices are deeply embedded in religious tradition, while others engage sacred 
realities with words and forms that borrow widely.  
The study of lived religion has, then, reinforced the importance of understanding 
religion itself as more than cognitive, more than a worldview. It is still the case that 
conversations are the plausibility structures that sustain religious life, but we must situate 
those conversations in material and embodied practices. The plausibility structures that 
sustain religious life are social settings as well as social relationships, embodied actions as 
well as modes of discourse.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In The Sacred Canopy, Peter Berger set out a theory of religion that has endured. He 
drew together foundational social theories from the century before him, providing an account 
of how human beings create and live in worlds that are ordered and meaningful. He showed 
us how religious consciousness and religious action are socially produced and maintained, 
and he gave us the theoretical tools to go beyond his own account. Religion, it turns out, is as 
multi-dimensional as the social world itself. It is neither confined to individual minds nor to 
self-contained religious institutions; but it is still social, still emergent in interactions where 
the people and the place and the words all conspire to make religious practice possible and 
even taken-for-granted. The notion that religion requires a plausibility structure is no less true 
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and is as theoretically useful as ever. It simply needs a broader understanding of the 
structures in question and a deeper understanding of how plausibility is constituted. Those 
structures are as broad as the places where religiously-inflected conversation can happen, and 
as deep as the gestures, objects, and experiences that are as real as the words and ideas that 
were more central to Berger’s work. Our current and future study of religion both builds on 
his theorizing and must go beyond it. 
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Endnotes 
1 It is perhaps worth noting how congruent this notion is to Bourdieu’s concept of the “field” (1990). 
Bourdieu more explicitly took institutions and power into account, but within a field of interaction, certain kinds 
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of relationships and actions become habitually ingrained. Both theories take account of the way actual social 
interaction is cognitively reproduced in ways that normalize it. 
2 Ironically, he notes this very issue in Durkheim’s theory. Berger (1967, fn 21, chapter 2) 
acknowledged that Durkheim’s notions of ritual and social cohesion are hard to translate past the smallest 
societies. 
3 In his 2014 book on pluralism, for instance, he writes that we should not “over-estimate the coherence 
of human consciousness. In the experience of most individuals, secularity and religion are not mutually 
contradictory” (p. 53). The research I will draw on below certainly supports that statement, although Berger 
never cites it. 
4 For a fuller exploration of these findings, see the concluding chapters of Sacred Stories, Spiritual 
Tribes (Ammerman, 2013). In my simultaneously-published response (Ammerman, 2014) to Berger’s 2014 
book, I drew on these findings to elaborate my assessment of what he had still not fully comprehended about 
pluralism. 
5 My own exposition of the current state of the field can be found in Ammerman (2016). 
6 See, for example scholarship emerging from the University of Virginia’s Project on Lived Theology 
(http://www.livedtheology.org/). 
 
